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ABSTRACT
Kidney donations from living donors form an aractive alterna-
tive to long waiting times on a list for a post-mortem donation.
However, even if a living donor for a given patient is found, the
donor’s kidney might not meet the patient’s medical requirements.
If several patients are in this position, they may be able to exchange
donors in a cyclic fashion. Current algorithmic approaches for de-
termining such exchange cycles neglect the privacy requirements
of donors and patients as they require their medical data to be
centrally collected and evaluated. In this paper, we present the rst
distributed privacy-preserving protocol for kidney exchange that
ensures the correct computing of the exchange cycles while at the
same time protecting the privacy of the patients’ sensitive medical
data. We prove correctness and security of the new protocol and
evaluate its practical performance.
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1 INTRODUCTION
According to Eurotransplant’s 2019 Annual Report [7], at the end
of 2019 a total of 10,723 patients were on the waiting list for a
kidney transplant from a post mortem donation in the participating
countries.1 Patients in need of a kidney transplant can considerably
reduce their waiting time if they nd a compatible living donor.
Such a living donor typically is a person with strong personal ties
to the patient such that she is willing to donate one of her kidneys
to the patient. While living donations increase the number of
patients receiving a kidney transplant, only about 37% of all kidneys
transplanted in 2019 in the Eurotransplant region corresponded to
such living donations [7]. Although in many cases a patient can
1Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and
Slovenia.
nd a willing donor, this donor’s kidney is oen incompatible with
the patient’s medical characteristics.
To increase the number of living donations, many countries
world-wide allow so-called living donor exchanges. Here, patients
with incompatible living donors are allowed to exchange donors
in a cyclic fashion such that each patient whose donor gives her
kidney to another patient also receives a donation from some other
patient’s donor. All transplants in such a cycle are typically required
to be executed simultaneously [1]. is prevents that a donor with-
draws from donating as soon as her patient received a kidney. Due
to the large number of medical sta and the vast resources that are
needed to carry out a kidney transplant, the number of simultane-
ously executable transplants is limited. Commonly, the maximum
cycle sizem considered for kidney exchange ism = 3 such that a
maximum of 6 operations on three donors and patients each are
carried out simultaneously [1]. Figure 1 shows an example of three
parties, i.e., pairs consisting of a patient and her incompatible donor
who exchange their donors in form of an exchange cycle of size 3.
Given a xed set of parties, the problem of nding a set of disjoint
exchange cycles that allows for as many patients as possible to re-
ceive a compatible kidney is known as the Kidney Exchange Problem
(KEP) [1]. e problem can be formulated as a graph problem on
the so-called compatibility graph in which each party is represented
as a node in the graph and a directed edge is added from node i to
node j i the donor of party Pi is compatible with the patient of
party Pj (cf. Figure 1). Solving the KEP then corresponds to nding
a set of exchange cycles in the compatibility graph that maximizes
the number of patients that can receive a kidney transplant.
While in the past many algorithmic approaches for eciently
solving the KEP have been proposed (e.g., [1, 2, 20]), these ap-
proaches do not consider the existence of an adversary trying to
compromise the parties’ privacy or to manipulate the computa-
tion of the exchanges. However, given the sensitivity of a context
such as kidney exchange, algorithmic solutions should be resilient
against any form of manipulation by an external adversary. To the
best of our knowledge, the existing algorithmic solutions for kid-
ney exchange require the parties to reveal their sensitive medical
data to a central platform where all this data is gathered and the
exchange cycles to be executed are determined. With the central
storage of all data, an adversary only needs to compromise one
entity in order to obtain access to the parties’ medical data. If such
an aack remains undetected, the adversary may even be able to
manipulate the actual computation of the exchange. An adversary
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Figure 1: Living donor exchange based on an exchange cycle of size 3 between three parties each consisting of a patient and
her incompatible donor.
may thereby, e.g., wrongfully force that a particular patient receives
a compatible donor organ.
In this paper, we address this shortcoming by presenting the rst
privacy-preserving protocol for solving the KEP. Specically, we
propose a de-centralized approach that allows the parties to keep
their medical data private at all times. We prove correctness and
security of our protocol in the presence of a semi-honest adversary
where an adversary controls a xed set of corrupted parties that
strictly follow the protocol specication but try to learn as much as
possible about the honest parties’ input. To this end, we use Secure
Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) which is a cryptographic primitive
that allows a xed set of parties to compute a functionality F
without the need of a trusted central entity such that a party only
knows its private input and learns the output of the computation
and what can be deduced from both. Using the formalism of SMPC
allows us to formally prove correctness and security of our new
protocol. Note that security in the semi-honest model is sucient
to prevent any meaningful manipulation of the computed exchange
as all computations are executed on encrypted data. ereby, it is
impossible for an adversary to adapt a patient’s input in order to
increase her chances of nding a compatible donor.
Our privacy-preserving kidney exchange protocol builds on an
existing SMPC protocol for privacy-preserving multi-party barter-
ing [25] which allows a set of parties to determine a trade that
is optimal w.r.t. a pre-dened welfare function (e.g., maximizing
the number of parties that can trade). In our protocol for kidney
exchange, a party consists of a patient and her incompatible donor
which we also refer to as a patient-donor pair. e private input of
each party comprises the medical data of their patient and donor
that is necessary to determine the compatibility between a patient
and a donor. At the beginning of our protocol, all parties com-
pute an encrypted adjacency matrix encoding the compatibility
graph induced by their private inputs. To this end, we introduce
a new SMPC protocol for privacy-preserving compatibility check
for kidney exchange. Upon input of the medical data relevant for
a kidney exchange between a patient and a donor, this protocol
outputs an encryption of 0 if a transplant between the patient and
the donor is not possible (based on their medical data) and an en-
cryption of 1 if the donor may be compatible with the patient. Note
that it is not possible to determine the compatibility between a pa-
tient and a donor with certainty on an algorithmic basis as the nal
decision has to be made by medical experts. en, the constructed
encrypted adjacency matrix is evaluated against a pre-computed
set of all existing exchange constellations. is set is generic w.r.t.
the input of the patient-donor pairs, i.e., it comprises all possible
constellations in which the parties could exchange their donors.
ereby, those exchange constellations that can be executed based
on the parties’ private inputs (i.e., their relevant medical data) are
determined in an oblivious fashion. In particular, the parties do
not learn which of the constellations are executable. Finally, one
of the executable exchange constellations is chosen uniformly at
random such that the number of kidney transplants that can be exe-
cuted is maximized. Each party’s output then comprises suggested
exchange partners for that party.2
e main dierence between our privacy-preserving kidney ex-
change protocol and the protocol for privacy-preserving bartering
from [25] is the construction of the encrypted adjacency matrix
that encodes the compatibility graph. While in bartering, comput-
ing the compatibility between two parties only requires to check
whether their respective oers and demands are the same, in kid-
ney exchange the compatibility check involves the comparison of
complex medical data of the donor and the patient of the respec-
tive two parties. us, the main contribution of this paper is the
development of a privacy-preserving compatibility check protocol
for kidney exchange and its secure integration into the existing
privacy-preserving bartering protocol. Furthermore, we formally
prove the correctness and security of our new protocol for com-
patibility check and show that our modications to the protocol
for bartering for the context of kidney exchange do not impact the
correctness and security of the original protocol.
We have implemented our protocol on top of an existing frame-
work for SMPC [19] and report on the evaluation of its performance.
Specically, we have measured the runtime and induced network
trac for dierent numbers of parties and analyzed the perfor-
mance impact of each of the dierent phases of our protocol.
Outline: e remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We
2Note that in practice it is necessary that a medical professional reviews and veries
the determined exchange cycles before the transplants may proceed.
2
Key Generation:
• Generate two primes p = 2p′ + 1,q = 2q′ + 1 of bit length s/2 s.t. p′,q′ are also primes
• Set n := pq, n′ := p′q′ and select β ←$ Z∗n , (a,b) ←$ Z∗n × Z∗n
• Set д := (1 + n)a · bn mod n2 and Θ := an′β mod n
• Public key: (д,n,Θ), Private key: (τ , ι) sharing of βn′
• Plaintext space: P := Z∗n , Ciphertext space: C := Z∗n2
Encryption:
• m ∈ P, r ←$ Z∗n ,E(m) := дmrn mod n2
Homomorphic Properties:
• E(m1) +h E(m2) := E(m1) · E(m2) = E(m1 +m2) (homomorphic addition)
• E(m) ×h a := (E(m))a = E(a·m) and E(m) ×h 0 := E(0) with a ∈ Z\{0} (homomorphic scalar multiplication)
• E(m1) −h E(m2) := E(m1) +h (E(m2))−1 = E(m1 −m2) (homomorphic subtraction)
Figure 2: Overview of the reshold Paillier Cryptosystem from [9].
rst introduce notation, review existing building blocks (Section
2) and discuss related work (Section 3). In Section 4, we intro-
duce our new privacy-preserving compatibility check for kidney
exchange. en, in Sections 5 and 6 we present and analyze our
privacy-preserving kidney exchange protocol. We close this paper
with some remarks on future work.
2 PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
Our new SMPC protocols make use of a threshold variant of the
Paillier cryptosystem [9] and several previously introduced building
blocks. In this section, we review these together with the notation
we use in the remainder of this paper.
For a nite set S , r ←$ S denotes that r is drawn uniformly
at random from S . N0 is the set of natural numbers including 0
and N the set of natural numbers without 0. For i ∈ N, we dene
Ni := {1, ..., i}. e Iverson-Bracket [·] for a logical statement B is
dened as [B] := 1 i B is true and [B] := 0, otherwise. We denote
the set of all prime numbers contained in an integer interval I
by PI . By P := {1, ..., ι} we denote the index set of the parties
P1, ..., Pι participating in a multi-party protocol pi . C refers to the
index set of the corrupted parties.
2.1 reshold Paillier Cryptosystem
e SMPC protocols presented in this paper are based on the (τ , ι)
threshold variant of the Paillier cryptosystem introduced in [9],
which is an additively homomorphic cryptosystem providing for
semantic security against chosen-plaintext aacks. e decryption
key is distributed among all ι parties such that at least τ ≤ ι parties
have to collaborate to decrypt a ciphertext. Figure 2 shows an
overview of the key generation, the encryption function, and the
homomorphic properties of the threshold Paillier variant we use in
this paper.
For convenience, we omit the public and private key from no-
tation and simply write JmK := E(m) to denote the encryption
of a message m. We denote the entrywise encryption of a vector
U = (u1,...,un ) by JU K := (Ju1K,..., JunK) and the entrywise encryp-
tion of a matrix A := (a1,1,...,am,n ) by JAK := (Ja1,1K,..., Jam,nK).
Furthermore, we dene JU [i]K := Jui K and JA[i, j]K := Jai, j K.
2.2 Secure Multi-Party Computation
In SMPC a xed set of parties P1, ..., Pι jointly compute an ι-input
functionality F : ({0, 1}∗)ι → ({0, 1}∗)ι such that no party learns
anything more than its private input, the computed output, and
what can be deduced from both. is still holds in the presence of
an adversary controlling τ < ι parties. e goal of the adversary
is to gather as much knowledge as possible on the honest parties’
input or to manipulate the outcome of the computation.
In this paper, we consider a semi-honest adversary, i.e., the par-
ties controlled by the adversary follow the protocol specications
but try to learn as much as possible on the honest parties’ input.
e semi-honest adversary model is sucient for many real-world
applications [17] where the protocol is embedded into complex sys-
tems. In such seings, the benet from deviating from the protocol
specication is typically small compared to the eort it takes [13].
Besides, deriving a protocol secure in the semi-honest model is
oen a rst step towards a protocol secure in the presence of a
malicious adversary where the parties may arbitrarily deviate from
the protocol specication.
Security in the semi-honest model is dened as follows. e
view of a party Pi during the execution of a multi-party protocol pi
with input x := (x1, ...,xι ) and security parameter s is denoted
by VIEWpii (x , s) := (xi , ri ,mi,1, ...,mi,k ) with mi, j being the j-th
message received by party Pi during the execution of pi and ri rep-
resenting the internal coin tosses of party Pi . Let OUTPUTpii (x , s)
refer to the output of party Pi . We use xC , FC (x), and VIEWpiC (x , s)
as short-hand notation for (xi1 , ...,xκi ), (Fi1 (x), ...,Fiκ (x)), and
(C,VIEWpii1 (x , s), ...,VIEWpiiκ (x , s)).
Denition 2.1 (Security in the Semi-Honest Model [13]). A multi-
party protocol pi securely computes a functionality F if there exists
a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm S such that for every κ
with 0 < κ < ι it holds that {(S(1s ,C,xC ,FC (x)),F (x))}x,s and
{(VIEWpiC (x , s),OUTPUTpi (x , s))}x,s are computationally indistin-
guishable.
We call S the simulator and denote the simulated values by angle
brackets 〈·〉. We distinguish between protocol functionalities F
(resp., protocols pi ) and gate functionalities G (resp., gates ρ). A gate
functionality G (resp., gate ρ) is a protocol that receives encrypted
inputs and/or returns encrypted outputs.
3
Gate Communication complexity Round complexity
ρMult O(ιs) O(1)
ρLT O(ιs) O(ι)
ρCRS-C O(ιns) O(ιn)
Table 1: Complexities of gate implementations [6, 21, 22].
2.3 Existing Gates
We review three existing gate functionalities which we use in our
newly developed protocols. e complexities of their implementa-
tions are given in Table 1.
Denition 2.2 (GMult: Secure Multiplication [6]). Let each party
Pi (∀i ∈ P) hold the two encrypted integers JxK and JyK. en,
gate functionality GMult is specied as Jx · yK← GMult(JxK, JyK).
As shorthand notation for the subsequent execution of gate ρMult
we use ρUFI-Mult (Unbound Fan In Multiplication) as introduced
in [21].
Denition 2.3 (GLT: Secure Less-an Comparison [21]). Let each
party Pi (∀i ∈ P) hold the two encrypted integers JxK and JyK. en,
gate functionality GLT is given as J[x < y]K← GLT((JxK, JyK)).
In [21] the author presents a gate for secure comparison in the
semi-honest model that provides for shared output, i.e., each party
receives a bit such that the XOR of all these bits yields the output
bit b. However, it is trivial to modify this gate such that it provides
each party with an encrypted output bit JbK without revealing any
information on b and thus implementing functionality GLT.
Denition 2.4 (GCRS-C: Conditional Random Selection with Output
Check [22]). Let each party Pi (∀i ∈ P) hold two vectors JU K andJV K of lengthn. Let JU K be an encrypted indicator vector and let JV K
be an encrypted value vector. en functionality GCRS-C is given as
((Ju∗k K, Jv∗k K)) ← GCRS-C((JU K, JV K)) with Ju∗k K := Blind(Juk K) andJv∗k K := Blind(vk ) where k ←$ {l ∈ Nn : ul = max(u1, ...,un )} if
there is at least one l ∈ Nn such that ul > 0. Otherwise, GCRS-C
returns (⊥,⊥) where ⊥ denotes the empty string.
3 RELATEDWORK
Four main directions of work are related to the problem we solve:
(1) Conventional algorithms that solve the KEP without considering
privacy. (2) Privacy-preserving bartering protocols that can identify
cyclic exchange options between parties bartering conventional
goods while meeting specic privacy guarantees. (3) Protocols
for private intersection cardinality testing that solve a problem
that is similar to a subproblem we face in our privacy-preserving
protocol for compatibility check in kidney exchange (cf. Section 4.2).
(4) Privacy-preserving protocols for matching in bipartite graphs.
3.1 Conventional Static Kidney Exchange
Currently, the most ecient solutions for the KEP are based on
Integer-Programming (IP) techniques (e.g., [1, 2, 20]). All these
approaches consider a graph where each patient-donor pair corre-
sponds to a node and an edge is added between two pairs i the
donor of the rst pair is compatible with the patient of the second
pair. e most ecient approach to date is referred to as the cycle
formulation where a binary decision variable is introduced for each
cycle up to a cycle size boundm. e constraint is that each node
is part of at most one cycle and the goal is to maximize the number
of nodes in the solution. While these approaches solve the KEP
eciently in the non-privacy-preserving seing, they cannot be
used as a basis for a privacy-preserving SMPC protocol since not
all optimal solutions are obtained aer the same number of opti-
mization rounds. Instead the number of rounds needed depends on
the input. Yet, a privacy-preserving protocol requires a control ow
which is independent of the input. us, for our privacy-preserving
kidney exchange protocol we have to take a dierent approach.
3.2 Privacy-Preserving Multi-Party Bartering
In privacy-preserving multi-party bartering, the parties strive to de-
termine trades such that their oers and demands are matched while
keeping their input private. Kidney exchange can be considered as
a special case of bartering where a party consists of a patient-donor
pair, the oer corresponds to the donor’s medical data that is rele-
vant for the kidney exchange, and the demand corresponds to the
corresponding patient’s medical data. Frikken and Opyrchal [11]
propose a two-party SMPC protocol to compute a trade from which
both parties benet allowing the parties to keep their utility on
a public set of commodities private. Kannan et al. [15] present a
protocol that computes trades such that the parties can keep their
preferences over a public set of commodities as well as their oered
commodity private. In contrast to these two approaches, in the
case of a privacy-preserving kidney exchange protocol, the set of
commodities, which corresponds to the patients’ and donors’ medi-
cal data, has to remain private. Wu¨ller et al. [21, 23–26] propose
several SMPC protocols for multi-party bartering that vary w.r.t.
the level of security they provide, the trade structures that can be
computed, and their performance. All protocols exhibit the prop-
erty that during their execution a party only knows its private input
and learns the computed output and what can be deduced from
both. In particular, the protocol from [25] allows for the computa-
tion of trades consisting of cycles of bounded size and it provides
for security in the semi-honest model. As these are properties we
also require for a privacy-preserving kidney exchange, we use this
protocol as the basis for our privacy-preserving kidney exchange
protocol (cf. Section 5.2).
3.3 Private Intersection Cardinality Testing
Private intersection cardinality testing (PICT) refers to the problem
of testing whether the intersection between sets of dierent parties
is larger than a threshold T . Existing protocols that solve the PICT
problem (e.g., [3, 10, 12]) are either only designed for the two-party
case or for the multi-party case where each party inputs a private
set and it is checked whether the size of the intersection of all these
sets is larger thanT . However, the privacy-preserving compatibility
check for kidney exchange (cf. Section 4.2) requires a multi-party
protocol that computes whether the intersection between the sets
of only two parties is empty (resp., non-empty). Furthermore, the
existing protocols for PICT assume that the size of the input sets is
public knowledge whereas in the case of kidney exchange the actual
size of the sets has to remain private. We therefore devise a new
4
Blood Type Can Donate To Can Receive From
O O, B, A, AB O
B B, AB O, B
A A, AB O, A
AB AB O, B, A, AB
Table 2: Blood type compatibility for kidney exchange [8].
approach for computing PICT that meets the special requirements
of the compatibility check for kidney exchange (cf. Section 4.2).
3.4 Privacy-Preserving Matching in Bipartite
Graphs
In the literature there are several protocols for the privacy-preserving
computation of a matching in a bipartite graph (e.g., [5, 14, 26]).
While these approaches could be used to solve the sub-problem of
the KEP that restricts itself to nding only cycles of size 2 or to
nding cycles of unbounded size (cf. [26]), these protocols do not
support the determining of exchange cycles of bounded size larger
than 2. us, they cannot be used in the context of the KEP when
considering a maximum cycle sizem = 3.
4 PRIVACY-PRESERVING COMPATIBILITY
CHECK FOR KIDNEY EXCHANGE
Our new gate ρComp computes the compatibility between a pa-
tient in need of a donor organ and a potential donor in a privacy-
preserving fashion. Note that the gate ρComp is the main new
building block that is required to modify the existing SMPC pro-
tocol for privacy-preserving multi-party bartering from [25] such
that it can be used to solve the KEP. Before providing the detailed
gate specication (cf. Section 4.2), we discuss the relevant medical
data each party has to provide as input (cf. Section 4.1).
4.1 Relevant Medical Data
To recall, the starting point for our gates and protocols is the fact
that for for all parties Pi (i ∈ P), their respective donor and patient
are not compatible and the goal is to nd other parties such that
compatibility between donors and patients from dierent parties
potentially allows for a kidney transplant. Determining whether or
not a patient and a donor are compatible requires the considering
of various criteria. And even if all such criteria are met, this is
not a guarantee that a transplant can be executed between what
was determined to be a compatible patient and donor. In fact, the
nal decision as to whether a transplant should be carried out,
lies with an experienced medical professional3. Consequently, our
compatibility check gate is designed to include only such checks of
criteria that in case they do not match between a donor and a patient
render a transplant impossible. According to transplant experts
from the RWTH University hospital (which is a major transplant
center in Europe), two such criteria are the blood type compatibility
and HLA-type compatibility. However, it is important to note that
our gate can be easily extended to include additional criteria if
deemed necessary and suitable.
3Our kidney exchange protocol (cf. Section 5) outputs potential exchange partners for a
patient-donor pair which will be recommended to and veried by medical professionals.
HLA-A HLA-B HLA-C HLA-DQ HLA-DR
A1 A32 B7 B40 B52 B81 C1 DQ2 DR1 DR15
A2 A33 B8 B41 B53 B82 C2 DQ3 DR3 DR16
A3 A34 B13 B42 B54 C3 DQ4 DR4
A11 A36 B14 B44 B55 C4 DQ5 DR7
A23 A43 B15 B45 B56 C5 DQ6 DR8
A24 A66 B18 B46 B57 C6 DR9
A25 A68 B27 B47 B58 C7 DR10
A26 A69 B35 B48 B59 C8 DR11
A29 A74 B37 B49 B67 DR12
A30 A80 B38 B50 B73 DR13
A31 B39 B51 B78 DR14
Table 3: Antigens relevant for determining HLA-type com-
patibility in kidney exchange [16].
Table 2 summarizes what denes compatibility between the
blood type of a donor and a patient. Specically, there are four
dierent blood types, i.e., O, A, B, AB and a donor with a certain
blood type can only donate to patients with a certain blood type.
For example, if the donor has blood type A, the patient’s blood type
has to be A or AB in order for the donor blood type compatibility
to be met.
Table 3 lists the antigens which are relevant in the context of
a kidney transplant. Every human has certain antigens which are
grouped into several HLA types. As there is an increased risk
for acute rejection in case of an HLA incompatible kidney trans-
plant [18], our compatibility check only seeks for HLA compatible
donors. Specically, this means that the recipient has no HLA anti-
bodies against the donor’s antigens in the HLA-A, -B, -C, -DQ, and
-DR loci.
us, our gate ρComp computes an encrypted output bit JoK in-
dicating the compatibility between a donor and a patient of two
dierent parties based on their blood types and their antibodies/anti-
gens. In particular, if o = 0, then the donor and the patient are not
compatible and a transplant between them is not possible. If o = 1,
the donor and the patient may be compatible and the nal decision
whether or not a transplant can be carried out lies with medical
professionals (cf. Footnote 3).
4.2 Ideal Functionality and Gate Specication
Before formally dening the functionality computed by our compat-
ibility check gate for kidney exchange, we introduce the encoding
of each party’s input comprising the medical data described in Sec-
tion 4.1. We encode compatibility with the patient’s blood type by
a binary indicator vector Bpi stating for each of the four existing
blood types (O, B, A, AB) whether or not the patient of party Pi can
receive a kidney donor of that blood type. For example, if the pa-
tient of party Pi has blood type B, the corresponding patient blood
type indicator vector is Bpi = [1, 1, 0, 0] (cf. Table 2). Analogously,
compatibility with the donor’s blood type is encoded by the donor
blood type indicator vector Bdi which indicates for each blood type
whether the donor can donate to a patient with that blood type. e
patient antibody vector Api is also a binary indicator vector stating
for each known antigen as specied in Table 3 whether the patient
has an antibody against it. Similarly, the donor antigen vector Adi
5
Gate 1 Secure Compatibility Check for Kidney Exchange
1. Input Sharing Phase
1.1. Party Pi : Send JBdi K, JAdi K to party Pj
1.2. Party Pj :
1.2.1. Set JsumBK := J0K, JsumAK := J0K
1.2.2. For k = 0 to |Bpj | − 1:
1.2.2.1. If [Bpj [k] = 1]: Set JsumBK := JsumBK+h JBdi [k]K
1.2.3. For k = 0 to |Apj | − 1:
1.2.3.1. If [Apj [k] = 1]: Set JsumAK := JsumAK +hJAdi [k]K
1.2.4. Broadcast JsumBK, JsumAK to all parties
2. Compatibility Computation Phase
2.1. All parties:
2.1.1. Jointly compute JoBK← ρLT(J0K, JsumBK)
2.1.2. Jointly compute JoAK← ρLT(JsumAK, J1K)
2.1.3. Jointly compute JoK← ρMult(JoBK, JoAK)
3. Output Phase
3.1. Party Pi outputs JoK
indicates for each known antigen (cf. Table 3) whether or not the
donor has this antigen.
Denition 4.1 (GComp : Compatibility Check for Kidney Exchange).
Let a party Pi with i ∈ P hold blood type vector Bdi and antigen
vector Adi for its donor and another party Pj with j ∈ P hold blood
type vector Bpj and antibody vector A
p
j for its patient. en, gate
functionality GComp is given as JoK← GComp ((Bdi ,Adi ), (Bpj ,Apj ))
where JoK is an encrypted bit indicating whether a donation of
party Pi ’s donor to party Pj ’s patient can be excluded, i.e., o = 0 i
party Pi ’s donor is incompatible with party Pj ’s patient.
Gate 1 implements gate functionality GComp (cf. Denition 4.1).
In the following, we describe each of the three phases of gate ρComp
in detail.
1. Input Sharing Phase: Party Pi encrypts its donor blood
type vector Bdi and antigen vector A
d
i and sends both to
party Pj . Based on the encrypted donor blood type indica-
tor vector JBdi K, party Pj computes JsumBK which encodes
the number of entries of the donor blood type indicator
vector Bdi and the patient blood type indicator vector B
p
j
that are equal. To this end, it iterates over its patient blood
type vector Bpj and increments JsumBK by the k-th entry
of the encrypted donor blood type vector JBdi K of party Pi
for all k which correspond to blood types that are com-
patible with the blood type of party Pj ’s patient, i.e., for
all k where Bpj [k] = 1. us, aer Step 1.2.2, JsumBK en-
codes the number of blood types to which the blood type
of party Pi ’s donor as well as the blood type of party Pj ’s
patient are compatible according to Table 2. Similarly,
party Pj iterates over its patient antibody vector A
p
j and
computes JsumAK which encodes the number of antigens
of party Pi ’s donor against which party Pj ’s patient has
antibodies. Aerwards, party Pj broadcasts the encrypted
values JsumBK and JsumAK to all parties.
2. Compatibility Computation Phase: All parties jointly com-
pute an encrypted bit JoK indicating whether party Pi ’s
donor is incompatible with party Pj ’s patient, i.e., ifo equals
to 0, party Pi ’s donor cannot donate to party Pj ’s patient.
First, they check whether there is at least one blood type to
which both the blood type of party Pi ’s donor and the blood
type of party Pj ’s patient are compatible. To this end, the
parties execute gate ρLT to obliviously determine whether
sumB is larger than 0 and store the result in the encrypted
bit JoBK. Aerwards, they verify that party Pj ’s patient has
no antibodies against party Pi ’s donor. In particular, the
parties execute gate ρLT to obliviously determine whether
sumA is less than 1 and store the result in the encrypted
bit JoAK. Finally, they execute a multiplication gate ρMult
to check whether both conditions hold and store the result
in the encrypted bit JoK.
3. Output Phase: Each party just outputs the encrypted bit JoK.
In the following, we prove correctness and security of our com-
patibility check gate ρComp and analyze its complexity.
Correctness: To prove the correctness of gate ρComp, we show
that aer the computation of the input sharing phase sumB is larger
than 0 and sumA is less than 1 i the blood type of party Pi ’s donor
is compatible with the blood type of party Pj ’s patient and at the
same time party Pj ’s patient has no antibodies against the antigens
of party Pi ’s donor. If the k-th entry of the blood type vector B
p
j
equals 1, i.e., party Pj ’s patient is compatible with the blood type
encoded by Bpj [k], sumB is increased by the corresponding value of
party Pi ’s donor blood type indicator vector Bdi . us, sumB is only
increased if both Bpj [k] and Bdi [k] equal 1 and, thus, only if the blood
type of party Pi ’s donor and the blood type of party Pj ’s patient
are compatible. Similarly, sumA is only increased if both Adi [k] and
A
p
j [k] equal 1, i.e., only if party Pj ’s patient has an antibody against
the k-th antigen of party Pi ’s donor. us, aer the input sharing
phase sumB is larger than 0 i the blood type of party Pi ’s donor
is compatible with the blood type of party Pj ’s patient. Similarly,
sumA still equals 0, i.e., is less than 1, i party Pj ’s patient has no
antibodies against any of the antigens of party Pi ’s donor. Finally,
assuming the correctness of gates ρLT and ρMult, at the end of the
compatibility computation phase o equals 1 i sumB is larger than
0 and sumA is less than 1. Otherwise, o = 0. us, gate ρComp
correctly computes gate functionality GComp (cf. Denition 4.1).
Security: We assume that all parties Pi with i ∈ C ⊂ P and
C = {ic1 , ..., icκ } are corrupted. We have to dierentiate between
two cases for Step 1.1. First, if i ∈ C , the simulator S just encrypts
party Pi ’s input and sends it to party Pj . Second, if i < C and
j ∈ C , the simulator simulates each entry of the encrypted vectorsJBdi K and JAdi K by random ciphertexts. In the compatibility com-
putation phase, the simulator can simulate the values JsumBK andJsumAK by 〈JsumBK〉 ←$ C and 〈JsumAK〉 ←$ C, respectively.
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e calls to the gate ρLT in Step 2.1.1 and Step 2.1.2 are simulated
by calling the simulator of ρLT on the input (J0K, 〈JsumBK〉) and
(〈JsumAK〉, J1K), respectively. Similarly, the call to gate ρMult in
Step 2.1.3 is simulated by calling the simulator of ρMult on input
(〈JoBK〉, 〈JoAK〉). Finally, the simulator just outputs 〈JoK〉.
Due to the fact that the underlying cryptosystem is semantically
secure, it follows that the simulated view is statistically indistin-
guishable from the real view.
Complexity: e input sharing phase only comprises operations
that the parties Pi and Pj can execute locally. us, communication
and round complexity of this phase are in O(1). e compatibil-
ity computation phase requires the parties to execute gates ρLT
and ρMult. Communication and round complexity of our imple-
mentation of ρLT are O(ιs) and O(ι), respectively, whereas the
communication complexity of ρMult is O(ιs) and the round com-
plexity is O(1). us, gate ρComp overall exhibits a communication
complexity of O(ιs) and a round complexity of O(ι).
5 KIDNEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe our privacy-preserving protocolpiKEP-Rnd
that solves the KEP for a xed set of parties by choosing one optimal
solution uniformly at random from the set of all optimal solutions.
First, we introduce the necessary terminology together with the
ideal functionality (Denition 5.7) that is implemented by the proto-
col piKEP-Rnd (Section 5.1). en, we provide a detailed specication
of the protocol piKEP-Rnd together with an analysis of its correctness,
security, and complexity (Section 5.2).
5.1 Terminology and Ideal Functionality
e terminology introduced in this section is based on the termi-
nology for privacy-preserving bartering from [24] and adapted to
the use case of kidney exchange.
Each party Pi (∀i ∈ P) includes a patient seeking a kidney and
her incompatible donor oering a kidney. e input of such a party
then is the quote q(i) = (d(i),p(i)) where d(i) = (Bdi ,Adi ) contains
the donor-specic medical data that is relevant for a kidney trans-
plant, i.e., the donor blood type vector Bdi and the donor antigen
vectorAdi , and p
(i) = (Bpi ,A
p
i ) contains the patient-specic medical
data that is relevant in the context of a kidney transplant, i.e., the
patient blood type vector Bpi and the patient antibody vector A
p
i . In
our protocol, we only consider exchanges that are executed in form
of so-called exchange cycles since this is the only way to ensure
that a party’s donor only donates her oered kidney i the party’s
patient also receives a compatible kidney from the donor of another
party.
Denition 5.1 (Exchange Cycle). For a set of parties P1, ..., Pι and
the corresponding set of quotes q(1), .., q(ι), an exchange cycle of
size m is a tuple (Pi1 , Pi2 , ..., Pim ) with il , ik for l , k such that
the donor of Party Pil is compatible with the patient of Party Pil+1
for l ∈ {1, ...,m − 1} and the donor of Party Pim is compatible with
the patient of Party Pi1 according to Denition 4.1.
We call a set of exchange cycles disjoint and simultaneously ex-
ecutable if they have no party in common. e general idea of
our approach for our privacy-preserving kidney exchange proto-
col is to rst construct a compatibility graph which reects the
exchanges which are possible for a given set of parties and their
specic set of quotes. en, we identify simultaneously executable
exchange cycles within the compatibility graph to determine a set
of exchange cycles that maximizes the number of parties that can
receive a kidney transplant. Figure 3 illustrates the relationships
between the dierent graphs and how they are used to compute
the functionality FKEP-Rnd(W ) (cf. Denition 5.7).
Denition 5.2 (GC: Compatibility Graph). Given the private input
quotes q(i) = (d(i),p(i)) of all parties Pi with i ∈ P, a compatibility
graphGC is a directed graph (V ,E) withV := P = {1, ..., ι} and for
any i, j ∈ P with i , j it holds that (i, j) ∈ E if the donor quote d(i)
is compatible with the patient quote p(j) according to Denition 4.1.
e upper le corner of Figure 3 depicts an example of a compat-
ibility graph for four parties indicating the compatibility between
those parties. Specically, the edges of the compatibility graph
encode the compatibility between the four parties based on the
medical data of their donors and patients. For example, the edge
(1, 2) indicates that the donor of party P1 is compatible with the
patient of party P2 according to Denition 4.1.
In contrast to a compatibility graph, an exchange constellation
graph is generic, i.e., independent of a specic set of input quotes.
Specically, an exchange constellation graph represents one possi-
ble constellation of how the parties could exchange the kidneys of
their respective incompatible donors.
Denition 5.3 (GEC: Exchange Constellation Graph). An exchange
constellation graph GEC is a directed graph (V ,E) with V := P
where ∀i ∈ V : (deд+(i) = deд−(i) = 1) ∨ (deд(i) = 0).
While an exchange constellation graph only contains disjoint
exchange cycles, a compatibility graph may also contain exchange
cycles which are not simultaneously executable. e set of all ex-
change constellation graphs for a set of parties is denoted by GEC.
If the set only consists of all exchange constellation graphs that con-
tain exchange cycles up to sizem < ι, we denote this by GEC(m). e
upper right corner of Figure 3 depicts the set GEC(3) on the example
of four parties. is set includes all exchange constellation graphs
containing a single cycle of sizem = 2, all exchange constellation
graphs containing a single cycle of size m = 3, and all exchange
constellation graphs containing two cycles of sizem = 2.
Denition 5.4 (Neighborhood Constellation). Given an exchange
constellation graph GEC = (V ,E), for each node i ∈ V its neigh-
borhood constellation is dened as N (i)d,p = (N
(i)
d (GEC),N
(i)
p (GEC)).
e source node of the incoming edge is referred to as the donating
neighborN (i)d (GEC) := j if ∃(j, i) ∈ E andN
(i)
d (GEC) := 0, otherwise.
Similarly, the target node of the outgoing edge is referred to as the
receiving neighbor N (i)p (GEC) := j if ∃(i, j) ∈ E and N (i)p (GEC) := 0,
otherwise.
e set of all neighborhood constellations of a node i and a set
of exchange constellation graphs GEC is denoted by N(i)d,p (GEC).
e subgraph of a compatibility graph GC containing a set of
simultaneously executable exchange cycles is referred to as a Po-
tential Exchange Constellation (PEC) graph.
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Figure 3: Example of the privacy-preserving computation
of the suggested exchange constellation graphGSEC for a set
of four parties according to functionalityFKEP-Rnd(W ), based
on [24].
Denition 5.5 (GPEC: Potential Exchange Constellation Graph).
Given GC, an exchange constellation graph GEC is referred to as
potential exchange constellation graph GPEC if GEC is a subgraph
of GC (denoted by GEC v GC).
GPEC is the set of all potential exchange constellation graphs
for a compatibility graph GC and a set of exchange constellation
graphs GEC.
An example of the set GPEC for four parties is depicted in the
middle part of Figure 3. e set contains the only two exchange
constellation graphs from the set GEC(3) (upper right corner of Fig-
ure 3) that form a subgraph of the compatibility graph GC (upper
le corner of Figure 3).
e goal of our kidney exchange protocol is to determine a
potential exchange constellation graph that is optimal w.r.t. a pre-
dened welfare function.
Denition 5.6 (Welfare Function). A welfare function W(·) :
GEC → N0 maps an exchange constellation graph in GEC to a
welfare w ∈ N0 that measures the overall utility of an exchange
constellation graph.
roughout this paper we use the welfare function that counts
the edges in an exchange constellation graph, i.e., that counts the
number of patients that receive a kidney transplant in a given
exchange constellation graph.
Based on the above introduced terminology, we dene the ideal
functionality FKEP-Rnd(W ) which is implemented by our privacy-
preserving protocol piKEP-Rnd for the KEP.
Denition 5.7 (FKEP-Rnd(W ): Privacy-Preserving KEP with Ran-
dom Selection). Let each party Pi hold its private input quote q(i) =
(d(i),p(i)) (∀i ∈ P) with d(i) = (Bdi ,Adi ) being party Pi ’s donor in-
put quote and p(i) = (Bpi ,A
p
i ) being party Pi ’s patient input quote.
Further, let GEC be a publicly known set of exchange constellation
graphs for ι parties and let W(·) : GEC ← N0 be some publicly
known welfare function. en, functionality FKEP-Rnd(W ) is de-
ned as
(o1, ...,oι ) if GPEC , ∅
(0) otherwise
}
← FKEP-Rnd(W )(q(1), ..., q(ι),GEC)
with GSEC ←$ {GPEC ∈ GPEC : W(GPEC) is maximized} and
oi = N
(i)
d,p (GSEC).
e exchange constellation graph that is determined by function-
alityFKEP-Rnd(W ) is referred to as Suggested Exchange Constellation
(SEC) graph. In particular, the graph GSEC maximizes the number
of patients that can receive a kidney transplant. If there is more
than one graph maximizing the number of transplants, one of these
is chosen uniformly at random as the suggested exchange constella-
tion graphGSEC. us, the functionality FKEP-Rnd(W ) goes beyond
simply solving the KEP as it not only outputs some optimal solution
but provides for unbiasedness in that it outputs one optimal solution
chosen uniformly at random from the set of all optimal solutions.
e graph is called suggested exchange constellation graph since
the nal decision of whether the computed kidney transplants can
be carried out is still made by medical professionals.
e boom of Figure 3, depicts the suggested exchange constel-
lation graph GSEC. In this example, the graph GSEC suggests that
three patients may be able to receive a kidney transplant and as such
yields the maximum welfare of all potential exchange constellation
graphs in the set GPEC (middle part of Figure 3).
Aer introducing all necessary terminology, we now review the
complete example of the computation of functionality FKEP-Rnd(W )
between four parties as depicted in Figure 3. e upper le corner
depicts the compatibility graph GC indicating the compatibility
between the four parties computed based on the medical data of the
parties’ patients and donors. e upper right corner of the gure
shows the exchange constellation graph setGEC(3) for four parties and
a maximum cycle sizem = 3. Recall that this set is pre-computed
and does not depend on the specic inputs of the four patient-donor
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pairs that seek to compute functionality FKEP-Rnd(W ). Based on
the set of exchange constellation graphs GEC(3) and the compatibility
graph GC, the set of potential exchange constellation graphs GPEC
is computed. is set forms a subset of the set of all exchange
constellation graphs GEC(3) including only those exchange constella-
tion graphs that form a subgraph of the compatibility graph (i.e.,
∀GEC ∈ GEC(3) : GEC v GC). e set of all potential exchange con-
stellation graphs GPEC is depicted in the middle part of Figure 3.
Finally, one of those potential exchange constellation graphs that
maximize the welfare function W (i.e., the number of patients that
may receive a kidney transplant) is chosen uniformly at random as
the suggested exchange constellation graph GSEC. In the example
shown in Figure 3, the suggested exchange constellation graphGSEC
is the graph that contains one exchange cycle of size 3 including
parties P1, P2, and P3. is graph yields the maximum welfare of
the two potential exchange constellation graphs (middle part of
Figure 3) since it may allow three patients to receive a kidney trans-
plant whereas the other potential exchange constellation graph
may only allow two patients to receive a kidney transplant. e
graph GSEC then denes the output of functionality FKEP-Rnd(W )
for our example.
5.2 Specication of Protocol piKEP-Rnd
Our novel protocol piKEP-Rnd (cf. Protocol 1) implements function-
ality FKEP-Rnd(W ) in the semi-honest model. e input of each
party Pi to the protocol is the medical data of the party’s donor and
patient that is relevant for a kidney transplant (cf. Denition 4.1).
In particular, this corresponds to the donor input d(i) = (Bdi ,Adi )
containing the donor blood type vector Bdi and the donor antigen
vector Adi and the patient input p
(i) = (Bpi ,A
p
i ) containing the
patient blood type vector Bpi and the patient antibody vector A
p
i .
Recall that in our protocol the welfare function W(·) corresponds
to counting the number of patients that receive a kidney transplant,
i.e., counting the number of edges in the exchange constellation
graph.
1. Construction Phase: e parties jointly construct the en-
crypted adjacency matrix JAK encoding the edges of the
compatibility graph induced by the parties’ input quotes.
To this end, the parties execute gate ρComp for the donor
of each party Pi (∀i ∈ P) and the patient of each party Pj
(∀j ∈ P) with i , j. e corresponding entry Ja[i, j]K
of the encrypted adjacency matrix JAK is determined as
the result of the gate execution. In particular, at the end
of the construction phase each entry Ja[i, j]K contains an
encrypted bit indicating whether the edge (i, j) is present
in the compatibility graph or not. us, if a[i, j] = 0, a
transplant between party Pi ’s donor and party Pj ’s patient
is not possible.
2. Evaluation Phase: e previously computed adjacency ma-
trix JAK is used together with the publicly known set of
exchange constellation graphs GEC(3) (containing exchange
cycles up to sizem = 3) to determine which of the exchange
constellation graphs GECk (∀k ∈ |GEC(3) |) are potential ex-
change constellation graphs. To this end, for all edges
Protocol 1 piKEP-Rnd, based on [25].
1. Construction Phase
1.1. For each Pi (i ∈ P):
1.1.1. For each Pj (j ∈ P \ {i }) :
1.1.1.1. All parties jointly compute Jai, j K← ρComp(Pi , Pj )
2. Evaluation Phase
2.1. For each GECk = (V , E) ∈ GEC(3) with (il , jl ) ∈ E , k ∈ N|GEC(3) | ,
l ∈ N|E | :
2.1.1. All parties jointly computeJek K← ρUFI-Mult((Jai1, j1K, ..., Jai |E |, j |E | K))
2.2. All parties set JLK := (Je1K, ..., Je |GEC |K)
3. Prioritization Phase
3.1. Each party locally computesJL1K := (Je1K ×h W(GEC1 ), ..., Je |GEC(3) |K ×h W(GEC|GEC(3) |))
4. Mapping Phase
4.1. Each party Pi (i ∈ P):
4.1.1. Set S (i ) := ∅
4.1.2. For each N (i )d,p ∈ N
(i )
d,p (GEC(3) ) :
4.1.2.1. Select p ←$ PI (i ) \ S (i )
4.1.2.2. Update S (i ) = S (i ) ∪ {p(i )
N (i )d,p
}
4.2. Party Pι :
4.2.1. Set Ju (ι)k K := Jp(ι)N (ι)d,p (GECk )K with GECk ∈ GEC(3) (∀k ∈ N|GEC(3) |)
4.2.2. Send (Ju (ι)1 K, ..., Ju (ι)|GEC(3) |K) to party Pι−1
4.3. Party Pi for i from ι − 1 to 1 :
4.3.1. Set Ju (i )1 K := Blind(Ju (i+1)k K ×h p(i )N (i )d,p (GECk ))
with GECk ∈ GEC(3) (∀k ∈ N|GEC(3) |)
4.3.2. If i , 1 : Send (Ju (i )1 K, ..., Ju (i )|GEC(3) |K) to party Pi−1
4.4. Party P1 :
Broadcast JL2K := (Ju1K, ..., Ju |GEC(3) |K) := (Ju (1)1 K, ..., Ju (1)|GEC(3) |K)
5. Selection Phase
5.1. All parties jointly compute ((c∗1, c∗2 )) ← ρCRS-C((JL1K, JL2K))
5.2. If c∗1 = c
∗
2 = ⊥ :
5.2.1. Skip Steps 6 − 7
5.2.2. All parties output 0
5.3. Else (i.e., (c∗1, c∗2 ) = (Jl ∗1 K, Jl ∗2 K)):
5.3.1. All parties jointly compute l ∗2 = Dec(Jl ∗2 K)
6. Reverse Mapping Phase
6.1. Each party Pi (i ∈ P) :
6.1.1. For each p(i )
N (i )d,p
∈ S (i ) with N (i )d,p ∈ N
(i )
d,p (GEC(3) );
6.1.1.1. If p(i )
N (i )d,p
divides l ∗2 , set N
∗(i )
d,p := N
(i )
d,p and go to Step 7
7. Output Phase
7.1. Party Pi outputs N ∗(i )d,p
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of a specic exchange constellation graph GECk the corre-
sponding entries of JAK are multiplied together. e result
equals 1 if all edges that are present inGECk are also present
in the compatibility graph GC indicating that GECk is a sub-
graph of GC and thus that GECk is executable based on the
parties’ input quotes. Aerwards, each party holds an en-
crypted binary vector JLK indicating for eachGECk whether
it is executable or not.
3. Prioritization Phase: Since the welfare of an exchange con-
stellation graph in our protocol just corresponds to the
number of edges in the graph and since the set of exchange
constellation graphs is publicly known, the parties’ wel-
fare W(GECk ) of each exchange constellation graph GECk
(∀k ∈ GEC) is also publicly known. To obliviously add the
welfare of each executable exchange constellation graph
to the vector L, the parties can simply multiply the pub-
licly known welfare locally to each entry of the encrypted
vector JLK. e resulting encrypted vector is denoted byJL1K where an entry JL1[k]K is the encrypted welfare of
the exchange constellation graph GECk if the exchange con-
stellation graph is executable and a fresh encryption of 0,
otherwise.
4. Mapping Phase: Each party Pi (∀i ∈ P) is in possession of
an interval I (i) of positive integers containing |N(i)d,p (GEC(3) )|
distinct prime numbers such that for all i, j ∈ P with i , j
the intersection of the corresponding intervals is empty,
i.e., I (i) ∩ I (j) = ∅. Each party Pi assigns a unique prime
number p(i)
N (i )d,p
chosen uniformly at random from the set
PI (i ) of all prime numbers in the interval I (i) to each el-
ement of N(i)d,p (GEC(3) ), i.e., to each possible neighborhood
of party Pi . We denote the set of these prime numbers
chosen by a party Pi by S(i). e idea is that the parties
compute a prime number product for each exchange con-
stellation graph GECk ∈ GEC(3) such that each party’s con-
tributed prime number encodes the party’s neighborhood
in that exchange constellation graph. To this end, all parties
participate in the computation of the encrypted productJuk K with k ∈ GEC(3) of prime numbers for each exchange
constellation graph GEC ∈ GEC(3) such that each party sup-
plies one factor p(i)
N (i )d,p
. e resulting vector of encrypted
prime number products JL2K := (Ju1K, ..., Ju |GEC(3) |K) indi-
cates the neighborhood constellation, i.e., the suggested
exchange partners of each party for each exchange constel-
lation graph GECk . At the end of the mapping phase, JL2K
is broadcast.
5. Selection Phase: Using the two previously determined vec-
tors JL1K and JL2K as input, the parties jointly execute
the conditional random selection gate ρCRS-C in order to
choose the suggested exchange constellation graph GSEC
uniformly at random from all potential exchange constel-
lation graphs that maximize the welfare, i.e., that allow the
maximum number of patients to obtain a kidney transplant.
In case there is no such potential exchange constellation
graph, i.e., if GPEC = ∅, the parties learn that no suitable
exchange constellation graph could be found. Otherwise,
the gate returns (Jl∗1K, Jl∗2K) ∈ (JL1K, JL2K). Aerwards, all
parties jointly decrypt Jl∗2K and, thereby, learn the product
of prime numbers encoding the chosen suggested exchange
constellation graph GSEC.
6. Reverse Mapping Phase: Each party Pi derives its individ-
ual exchange partners from the prime number product l∗2
by checking which of its prime numbers divides l∗2 . e
neighborhood constellation N ∗(i)d,p that was mapped to this
prime number indicates the suggested exchange partners
of party Pi .
7. Output Phase: Each party Pi outputs oi = N ∗(i)d,p .
e only major change we apply to the privacy-preserving bar-
tering protocol from [25] is the computation of the adjacency matrix
in that for the KEP this computation is based on the newly intro-
duced gate ρComp for compatibility check. As the correctness and
security of this phase relies on the correctness and security of the
compatibility check gate ρComp, it is sucient to prove these prop-
erties for gate ρComp as shown in Section 4.2. e only other change
we apply to the protocol from [25] is that we skip the negotiation
phase where the parties determine the quantity of the commodities
to barter as for kidney exchange no commodities are necessary.
Since the rest of the protocol remains unchanged, we refer to the
security and correctness proofs for the bartering protocol provided
in [25].
Similarly, for the complexity analysis we refer to [25] except
for the construction phase which exhibits a communication com-
plexity of O(ι2 · O(ρComp)) = O(ι3 · s) and a round complexity of
O(ι2 · O(ρComp)) = O(ι3). ereby, we obtain the overall commu-
nication complexity O(ι3 · s + ι2 · s · |GEC(3) |) and round complexity
O(ι3 + ι · |GEC(3) |) for the protocol piKEP-Rnd.
6 EVALUATION
We have implemented our protocol piKEP-Rnd (cf. Protocol 1) on top
of the SMC-MuSe framework [19] which is an SMPC framework
that already implements the threshold Paillier cryptosystem (cf. Sec-
tion 2.1) and all gates used in our protocol except for our new
gate ρComp (cf. Section 4.2).
We use a client-server infrastructure where the clients run the
actual SMPC protocol and the server only forwards messages be-
tween clients and provides them with the keying material of the
threshold Paillier cryptosystem.
For the evaluation of our protocol, we have set up a cluster
of desktop machines running Ubuntu 16.04 which are connected
by a local area network. Each machine is equipped with an Intel
Xeon 5400 series CPU and 4GB RAM. One machine runs the server
soware and each of the other machines runs exactly one client
such that each party runs on its own machine.
e relevant parameters that inuence the performance of our
protocol are the number of participating parties ι and the key length
of the threshold Paillier cryptosystem. We consider numbers of
parties from 2 to 9 and a key length of 2,048 bit. We measure the
performance of our protocol based on the runtime and the overall
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Parties 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Runtime 14s 24s 44s 2m 6m 26m 2h 13h
Trac 400kB 1MB 3MB 10MB 40MB 200MB 1GB 5.5GB
|GEC(3) | 1 5 17 85 275 1211 5915 31067
Table 4: Runtimes, network trac, and size of the exchange constellation graph set GEC(3) of protocol piKEP-Rnd with a maximum
cycle sizem = 3.
network trac which corresponds to the accumulated incoming
trac of all parties. Each protocol run is repeated 10 times and the
results are averaged over the 10 repetitions.
Table 4 shows runtimes, network trac, and the size of the ex-
change constellation graph setGEC(3) for dierent numbers of parties.
We observe that for small numbers of parties, the protocol exhibits
a low runtime, e.g., for up to 5 parties the protocol completes within
two minutes. However, we also see that for larger numbers of par-
ties the runtime increases rapidly. For example, for 9 parties the
protocol’s runtime already amounts to 13 hours. A similar behavior
can be observed w.r.t. the network trac. While for 5 parties the
network trac is still only 10 MByte, for 9 parties the trac already
amounts to 5.5 GByte.
e exponential increase of runtime and network trac can be
aributed to the exponential increase of the set of exchange constel-
lation graphs GEC(3) which increases with the number of parties. We
observe that the size of GEC(3) is small for small numbers of parties,
e.g., for 5 parties there are only 85 exchange constellation graphs
with cycles up to sizem = 3. However, for larger numbers of parties,
the size of the set increases drastically. For example, for 9 parties
the set already includes 31,067 graphs.
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Figure 4: Split of the runtime for the most dominant phases
(construction, evaluation, selection) of the protocol piKEP-Rnd
consumes for increasing numbers of parties. e construc-
tion phase shows the inuence of our compatibility check
gate ρComp on the protocol piKEP-Rnd.
e runtime consumed by each phase of the protocol also in-
dicates that the size of the exchange constellation graph set GEC(3)
directly correlates with the performance of the protocol piKEP-Rnd.
Figure 4 shows the percentage of the overall runtime consumed by
each of the protocol phases for dierent numbers of parties. e bar
chart only includes the three phases construction, evaluation, and
selection as the other phases only consume negligible amounts of
time. We observe that with an increasing number of parties, the im-
pact of those phases whose performance increases with the size of
the exchange constellation graph set increases also. While the size
of the adjacency matrix that is computed during the construction
phase only increases quadratically with the number of participating
parties, the evaluation phase requires a call to the gate ρUFI-Mult
for each exchange constellation graph and thus its performance
increases with the size of the set of exchange constellation graphs.
Also, the performance of the selection phase depends on the size
of GEC(3) as the size of the input vectors L1 and L2 to the gate ρCRS-C
for conditional random selection is determined by the number of
exchange constellation graphs in GEC(3) . e execution of the selec-
tion phase clearly dominates the runtime of the other phases for
larger numbers of parties. Furthermore, Figure 4 shows that the
construction phase only has a small impact on the overall protocol
performance for increasing numbers of parties. Recalling that the
construction phase only consists of calls to our novel gate ρComp
for compatibility check in kidney exchange, we can deduce that
the impact of our gate ρComp on the overall performance of the
protocol piKEP-Rnd is also small for increasing numbers of parties.
is leads to the conclusion that the performance boleneck of
our kidney exchange protocol on the one hand is the implemen-
tation of conditional random selection and on the other hand is
due to the large size of the exchange constellation graph set GEC(3) .
us, a more ecient implementation of conditional random selec-
tion would directly lead to more ecient runtimes of our protocol
also for larger numbers of parties. Despite the long runtime of our
protocol for larger numbers of parties, the low runtimes for small
numbers of parties allow for the application of our protocol in a
dynamic kidney exchange system where the protocol is repeatedly
executed among small sets of parties.
Furthermore, it is important to note that for the application of
kidney exchange the protocol runtime is not critical as the KEP does
not have to be solved in real time. Instead, in practice living donor
programs in many countries (re-)evaluate incompatible patient-
donor pairs for exchange possibilities rather infrequently, typically
only once every few months [4].
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we have demonstrated that it is possible to devise a
privacy-preserving protocol for the KEP that exhibits very ecient
runtimes for a xed small number of parties. Also, since non-
privacy-preserving algorithms that are currently used to solve the
KEP do not run in real time but instead are typically only executed
once every few months, it is not an impediment in practice that the
runtime of our privacy-preserving protocol increases considerably
with a growing number of parties.
For future work we plan to pursue two main directions. First,
we aim to devise an overarching kidney exchange system that
11
will use our privacy-preserving protocol for the KEP at its core.
From a system perspective it is necessary to handle arriving and
departing parties as well as parties participating in more than one
protocol execution. is poses the challenge of dening a suitable
privacy notion outside of the traditional SMPC context. Second,
more recent non-privacy-preserving kidney exchange algorithms
also include so-called altruistic donors and provide for some means
of redundancy to mitigate the eects of last-minute failures (e.g.,
due to the drop-out of a donor). We plan to investigate whether
it is possible to implement such features in a privacy-preserving
fashion.
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